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Issues in the Third Circuit
MAKING UP FOR LOST TIME: THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S USE OF
REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States of America has a sad history of neglecting children
with mental and physical disabilities.' Through the efforts of advocates,
children with disabilities first obtained access to schooling in some states
in the early nineteenth century.2 Congress, however, did not directly ad-
dress the issue of education for children with disabilities until 1975, when
it passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act ("EAHCA"). 3
Special education law is still based on the EAHCA, which Congress
renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act4 ("IDEA") in
1990. 5
The IDEA provides federal funds to states that comply with its re-
quirements regarding education of children with disabilities. 6 The con-
cept at the foundation of the Act is that all children with disabilities are
1. See KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL
LAW 397-98 (4th ed. 1998) (dating earliest known school for children with disabili-
ties in America as 1817); Sharon C. Streett, The Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 35, 35 (1996) (stating that in 1975, of eight
million American children with disabilities, nearly one-half million were not receiv-
ing appropriate education and at least an additional million were excluded from
school).
2. See ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 397 (listing schools that were
opened in Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts during the
1800s).
3. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (providing federal funds to states for im-
proved educational services for children with disabilities); ALEXANDER & ALEXAN-
DER, supra note 1, at 396 (noting that EAHCA was first congressional act to protect
children with disabilities).
4. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000).
5. See ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 396 (noting that IDEA gov-
erns law today). This Casebrief uses EAHCA and IDEA interchangeably.
6. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2000) (limiting eligibility for assistance to those
states which demonstrate to Secretary of Education that their educational pro-
grams meet conditions of Act). Congress used its spending clause powers to enact
the IDEA. See id. Therefore, the statute will not be affected by the Supreme
Court's recent ruling that the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") is unconsti-
tutional as applied to states. See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, No. 99-
1240, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 1700, at *32 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2001) (holding that ADA, which
is based on Congress' Fourteenth Amendment powers, cannot be applied to
states).
(777)
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entitled to a free appropriate public education. 7 The Act contains an elab-
orate procedural provision with a framework for how the state should per-
form its duty and how parents and children can assert their rights. 8
The IDEA does not provide a catalog of appropriate remedies; rather,
it calls on the judiciary to grant such relief as the particular court deter-
mines appropriate. 9 When a child has missed months or even years of
appropriate public education, what can a court possibly do to make the
child whole? The United States Supreme Court has specifically endorsed
the remedy of tuition reimbursement for parents' payments to a private
school.' 0 Most circuits have read the statute, in combination with the Su-
preme Court's interpretation, as allowing compensatory education-pub-
7. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2000) (defining "[c]hild with a disability"). The
Act's definition is as follows:
a child with mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deaf-
ness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including
blindness), serious emotional disturbance (hereinafter referred to as
"emotional disturbance"), orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic
brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities;
and who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.
Id. The Act further provides a separate definition for children between the ages of
three and nine:
The term "child with a disability" for a child aged 3 through 9 may, at the
discretion of the State and the local educational agency, include a child
experiencing developmental delays, as defined by the State and as mea-
sured by appropriate diagnostic instruments and procedures, in one or
more of the following areas: physical development, cognitive develop-
ment, communication development, social or emotional development, or
adaptive development; and who, by reason thereof, needs special educa-
tion and related services.
Id.
The Act further provides that each child is entitled to a free public education.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(]) (stating that availability of free appropriate education
for all children from ages three to twenty-one (with some exceptions) is one condi-
tion before state is eligible to receive funds under IDEA). The Act defines free
appropriate education as:
special education and related services that-
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision
and direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary
school education in the State involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education
program required under section 614(d) [20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)].
20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (2000).
8. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i) (2) (B) (iii) (2000) (delineating administrative proce-
dures under Act).
9. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2000) (discussing, generally, finality of decisions at
initial hearing and on appeal).
10. See Sch. Dist. of Burlington Township v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374
(1985) (holding that "such relief as the court determines is appropriate" includes
tuition reimbursement).
[Vol. 46: p. 777
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lic education beyond the state's normal obligation. 1I A few circuits have
gone even further by allowing plaintiffs to recover monetary damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.12 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit allows all three remedies, making it a leader in guaranteeing
fair treatment of children with disabilities. 13
This Casebrief focuses on the remedies available for denial of an ap-
propriate education to children with disabilities. Part II discusses in detail
the history and present state of special education in the United States,
including the IDEA, its text, legislative history and application in case
law. 14 Part III details important case law in the Third Circuit regarding
remedies for violations of the IDEA.' 5 Finally, Part IV provides recom-
mendations to education advocates fighting for the rights of children with
disabilities in the Third Circuit.
16
II. BACKGROUND
A. Ground-breaking Cases: Pennsylvania Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v.
Pennsylvania and Mills v. Board of Education
The United States Supreme Court gave education advocates great
hope when it took a strong stance on the importance of education in the
landmark civil rights case Brown v. Board of Education. 7 It would be nearly
twenty years after Brown, however, before a federal court acted to increase
the access of children with disabilities to public education.' 8
In the 1971 decision in Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children
("PARC") v. Commonwealth,'9 a three judge panel in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that children with
mental disabilities in Pennsylvania were entitled to a free public educa-
11. See Streett, supra note 1, at 51 (stating that allowing compensatory educa-
tion is majority view); Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Educational Services in Special
Education Cases, 67 EDUC. L. REP. 881, 882-83 (1991) (noting shift towards allowing
compensatory education in 1980s).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing "civil action for deprivation of
rights"); Streett, supra note 1, at 52 (noting that minority of courts have granted
monetary damages for IDEA violations).
13. See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 248-53 (3d Cir. 1999)
(discussing tuition reimbursement, compensatory education and monetary
damages).
14. For a further discussion of special education in the United States, see infra
notes 17-113.
15. For a further discussion of Third Circuit law regarding remedies for IDEA
violations, see infra notes 114-56.
16. For practitioners notes, see infra notes 157-71.
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see alsoALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 398
(discussing precedent set by court-ordered desegregation of public schools and its
effect to strengthen case for all children's right to public education).
18. See ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 398 (noting that although
Supreme Court decided Brown in 1954, first case to grant children with disabilities
right to free public education was not decided until 1971).
19. 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
3
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tion. 20 The decision also provided that the state must not only educate
children with mental disabilities along with their peers without disabilities
as much as feasible, but also make periodic evaluations of such children.2 1
To ensure a state fulfills its obligation to all children, the court guaranteed
children procedures to challenge their school's actions.22
Just one year after the PARC decision, the United States District Court
of the District of Columbia expanded upon the Third Circuit's guarantees
with its holding in Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia.23 The
decision reached children with mental disabilities, as well as those who are
"emotionally disturbed, blind, deaf, and speech or learning disabled." 24
Guarantees made by the court-a free education designed for each child's
needs and due process procedures, including notice and an opportunity
to be heard-became the foundation of the upcoming federal
legislation.2
5
B. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Scholars credit the PARC and Mills decisions with awakening public
awareness and sparking congressional action concerning the problems fac-
ing children with disabilities. 26 In 1973, Congress passed the Rehabilita-
tion Act 27 to prevent discrimination against persons with disabilities in
20. See id. at 1258 (reporting consent agreement between parties that en-
joined state from taking any action "to postpone or in any way to deny to any
mentally retarded child access to a free public program of education and
training").
21. See id. at 1260 (expressing presumption that inclusion in regular public
school class is preferable to participation in special education class, which is prefer-
able to individual education).
22. See id. at 1261 (mandating re-evaluation at least every two years and pro-
viding parents with notice and right to request hearing upon each evaluation).
23. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). The seven children, who had been ex-
cluded from public schools in the District of Columbia, brought suit in Mills. See
id. at 868 (noting that plaintiffs, who had behavioral, emotional or mental
problems, had either never been admitted to public school or expelled after ad-
mission). The court declared that the state had an obligation, arising out of the
Constitution of the United States and the District of Columbia Code, to educate all
children. See id. at 876.
24. Id. at 868.
25. See id. at 872 (instructing school districts about children's rights); ALEXAN-
DER & ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 398 (describing Mills as laying groundwork for
federal legislation).
26. See ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 402 (asserting that cases
were largely responsible for public outcry and congressional action in 1973);
THOMAS F. GUERNSEY & KATHE KLARE, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 2 (1993) (noting
that PARC and Mills had "their national application four years later in IDEA");
MITCHELL L. YELL, THE LAW AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 60 (1998) (observing that
procedural provisions from PARC and Mills became framework for IDEA procedu-
ral safeguards); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-296, at 3 (1986) (beginning history of
IDEA with mention of PARC and Mills).
27. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, § 504 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (2000)) [hereinafter Section 504]. Although Section 504 has been codified
4
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government employment or provision of services. 28 The EAHCA, an act
aimed specifically at the education of children with disabilities, followed in
1975.29
1. Legislative History
Congress passed the IDEA to remedy the plight of more than eight
million children with disabilities in the United States-one million of
whom were completely excluded from public school, and the remainder
of whom did not receive sufficient services to benefit from their educa-
tion. 30 The current version of the statute recognizes improvements upon
the situation of the children with disabilities described in the original ver-
sion of the bill, but also notes that "the implementation of this Act has
been impeded by low expectations, and an insufficient focus on applying
replicable research on proven methods of teaching and learning for chil-
dren with disabilities. "31 Congress, through the 1997 amendment, an-
nounced its higher expectations of states and its commitment to providing
at a different section number in the United States Code, scholars continue to refer
to it as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1983. See, e.g., Allan G. Osborne,
Jr., Remedies for a School District's Failure to Provide Services Under IDEA, 112 EDuc. L.
REP. 1, 3 (1996) (referring to "Section 504," but citing to 29 U.S.C. § 794). This
Casebrief will follow that convention.
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 794. Section 504 provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability .in the United States...
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the partic-
ipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or
tinder any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by
the United States Postal Service.
Id. § 794(a). The Rehabilitation Act has been used to enforce the right of children
with disabilities to reasonable accommodations, thereby enabling them to partici-
pate in federally funded programs. See Osborne, supra note 27, at 3 (detailing
provisions of Section 504). Section 504 protects all individuals who have physical
or mental impairments that substantially limit at least one of their major life activi-
ties, those with a record of such an impairment, and those regarded as having such
an impairment. SeeYELL, supra note 26, at 61 (defining "handicapped" person as
used in Section 504). This Casebrief does not discuss in detail a child's rights
under Section 504 however, counsel for a child with disabilities should examine
the possibility of recovery tinder Section 504 as an alternative to recovery under
the IDEA. See id. at 95-124 (detailing history, principles and purpose of Section
504).
29. See Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Star. 773 (1990) (creating EAHCA); ALEXANDER
& ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 402 (reporting that both acts were presented to
Congress in 1973 and passed thereafter).
30. See 121 CONG. REC. 19,482 (1975) (reporting statement made by Senator
Randolph of West Virginia).
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (4) (2000). This version is the product of several con-
gressional amendments throughout the years. See generally Pub. L. No. 101-476,
104 Stat. 1141 (1990); Pub. L. No. 99-457, 100 Stat. 1145 (1986); Pub. L. No. 99-
372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986); Pub. L. No. 98-199, 97 Stat. 1357 (1983); Pub, L. No. 95-
561, 92 Stat. 2364 (1978).
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funding targeted for technology, research and training.3 2 The creators of
the amendment hoped it would allow educators and parents to cooperate
in order to benefit the children as individuals. 33
The IDEA is a truly bipartisan effort.34 The original bill passed 83-10
in the Senate and 375-44 in the House of Representatives. 35 In May 1998,
the House of Representatives passed the newest amendment by an over-
whelming majority of 420-3.36 The following day, the Senate passed the
32. See H.R. RP. No. 105-95, at 79. The House of Representatives named the
purposes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997 as
to clarify and strengthen the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")
by providing parents and educators with the tools to:
Preserve the right of children with disabilities to a free appropriate public
education; Promote improved educational results for children with disa-
bilities through early intervention, preschool, and educational exper-
iences that prepare them for later educational challenges and
employment; Expand and promote opportunities for parents, special ed-
ucation, related services, regular education, and early intervention service
providers, and other personnel to work in new partnerships at both the
State and local levels; Create incentives to enhance the capacity of schools
and other community-based entities to work effectively with children with
disabilities and their families, through targeted funding for personnel
training, research, media, technology, and the dissemination of technical
assistance and best practices.
Id.
33. See id. The authors named the purposes of the amendment are to:
review, strengthen, and improve IDEA to better educate children with
disabilities and enable them to achieve a quality education by:
Strengthening the role of parents;
Ensuring access to the general education curriculum and reforms;
Focusing on teaching and learning while reducing unnecessary
paperwork requirements;
Assisting educational agencies in addressing the costs of improv-
ing special education and related services to children with
disabilities;
Giving increased attention to racial, ethnic, and linguistic diversity
to prevent inappropriate identification and mislabeling;
Ensuring schools are safe and conducive to learning; and
Encouraging parents and educators to work out their differences
by using nonadversarial means.
Id.
34. See 143 CONG. REC. S4,410 (1997) (quoting Senator Lott as saying: "The
range of expertise and knowledge brought to bear in developing this bill as well as
the spirit of bipartisan, bicameral cooperation demonstrated in writing is unprece-
dented. I have seen nothing like this in my 24 years in Congress.").
35. See 121 CONG. REC. 25,543 (1975) (citing House of Representatives Roll-
call No. 450); 121 CONG. REC. 19,506 (citing Senate Rollcall Vote No. 227).
36. See 143 CONG. REC. H2,567 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (citing Rollcall No.
124).
[Vol. 46: p. 777
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bill by a nearly unanimous count of 98-1.3 7 Subsequently, President Clin-
ton signed the bill with high approval. 38
2. Guarantees
a. Free Appiopriate Public Education
The IDEA mandates that states provide every qualifying child with a
"free appropriate public education."39 A free appropriate public educa-
tion includes both "special education," which requires instruction of the
child in regular classroom subjects and physical education, and "related
services," which includes transportation and various support services. 40 Al-
though the education of children with disabilities may cost the state much
more than the education of children without such needs, a free appropri-
ate public education is guaranteed to each qualifying child at no addi-
tional cost.
4 1
The statute provides for preschool, elementary and secondary school
education, but it does not cover post-secondary education. 42 The state is
to provide the education through an Individualized Education Program
37. See 143 CONG. REc. S4,411 (daily ed. May 14, 1997) (citing Rolicall No.
66). The only vote against the bill came from Senator Gorton from Washington,
who worried that small school districts would not be able to handle the burden.
See id. at S4,409 (quoting statement by Senator Gorton).
38. See Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 5, 33
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 833 (June 9, 1997) (noting amendment's building upon
success of original bill, which "has made it possible for millions of children with
disabilities to receive an education, helping them become productive adults").
39. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2000) (stating that states, to be eligible for assis-
tance under IDEA, must meet several conditions, one being that it provide free
appropriate public education to every disabled child in its jurisdiction between
three and twenty-one years of age).
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25) (2000). The IDEA states: "The term 'special educa-
tion' means specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the
unique needs of a child with a disability, including- (A) instruction conducted in
the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; and
(B) instruction in physical education."
Id. The Act also provides for related services. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (22). The
Act defines related services as:
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive ser-
vices (including speech-language pathology and audiology services, psychological
services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic rec-
reation, social work services, counseling services, including rehabilitation counsel-
ing, orientation and mobility services, and medical services, except that such
medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be
required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and
includes the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in
children.
Id.
41. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (2000) (defining free appropriate public educa-
tion as special education and related services provided at public expense).
42. See id.
7
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("IEP"), described in the next Section.4 3 The state education agency must
ensure that school districts are providing each qualifying child with a free
appropriate public education.
44
Although the statute does not define "appropriate education," the Su-
preme Court set a standard in Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central
School District v. Rowley.45 In Rowley, the Court held that a child with a
severe hearing impairment, who sued for provision of a sign language in-
terpreter, did not require such an interpreter to receive an appropriate
education. 46 The Court stated that "the 'basic floor of opportunity' pro-
vided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related
services which are individually designed to provide education benefit to
the handicapped child." 47 Based on findings that the school district pro-
vided the child with both personalized instruction and related services de-
signed to meet her needs, and the lack of a finding suggesting that the
child was not benefiting from her education with an interpreter, the Court
held that the school district was providing an appropriate education.
48
Accordingly, it affirmed judgment for the school district. 49
b. Individualized Educational Program
As part of the requirement to provide a free appropriate public edu-
cation to each child with a disability, the state must create and implement
an IEP for each such child.50 The IEP must include an assessment of the
child's current level of education, a statement of "measurable annual
43. For a discussion of Individualized Education Programs, see infra notes 50-
52 and accompanying text.
44. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11) (2000) (defining obligations of state educa-
tional agency).
45. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
46. See id. at 184, 209-10.
47. Id. at 201. The Court's reference to the IDEA as a "floor" means that
states are free to mandate higher standards. See Streett, supra note 1, at 46 (stating
that until 1989 Arkansas held its school districts to higher standard).
There has been a great deal of litigation regarding the exact meaning of the
Court's mandate. See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 26, at 29-30 (discussing litiga-
tion in wake of Rowley decision). The Third Circuit requires the educational bene-
fits be more than trivial. See Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853
F.2d 171, 180 (3d Cir. 1988) ("We hold that the [IDEA] calls for more than a
trivial educational benefit."). The Third Circuit has also indicated that even if the
child is incapable of progressing from grade to grade, the school district must
ensure he or she is making some progress. See Bd. of Educ. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d
987, 991 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The Act ... requires a plan likely to produce progress,
not regression or trivial educational advancement.").
48. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209.
49. See id. at 209-10 (citing district court finding that school district provided
child with "adequate education").
50. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (11) (2000) (defining IEP). The statute states: "The
term 'individualized education program' or 'IEP' means a written statement for
each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance
with section 614(d) [20 USCS § 1414(d)]." Id.
784
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goals," and a description of the type, frequency and duration of special
education and related services that the state will provide the child for the
upcoming period. 5 1 The statute designates a team to design the IEP and
to review it at least annually.5 2
c. Least Restrictive Environment
The IDEA takes the policy stance that children with disabilities should
be educated alongside their non-disabled peers as much as possible.53
Segregation from the regular classroom is permissible only when necessary
for the child to receive an appropriate education. 54 The school district
must always consider whether the provision of supplemental aids or ser-
vices in the regular classroom would allow the child to receive an appro-
priate education before it may look to more restrictive environments. 55
3. Remedies
The IDEA provides that courts "shall grant such relief as the court
determines appropriate." 56 To compensate for lost educational time,
51. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (1) (A) (2000) (detailing specific requirements for
content of IEPs).
52. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4) (2000) (allowing for review of IEP as fre-
quently as IEP team deems necessary, but mandating at least one review per year).
The IEP team consists of parents, a regular education teacher, a special education
teacher, a representative of the local educational agency and, when appropriate,
the child. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (defining term "IEP team"). In addition,
the parents or agency have the right to include another special education special-
ist. See id. School districts often implement policies to hold an "annual review" for
each child with a disability either at the beginning or the end of the school year.
See Streett, supra note 1, at 40 (reviewing school district policies generally).
53. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (5) (2000) (calling for education of children with
disabilities with remainder of student population "[t]o the maximum extent ap-
propriate"); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding
"strong congressional preference" for educating children with disabilities in regu-
lar classroom). The circuits have developed different tests for whether a child has
been placed in the least restrictive environment. See Streett, supra note 1, at 47-49
(reviewing application of Rowley to least restrictive environment requirement).
54. See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1214 (recognizing difficulty of balancing main-
streaming requirement with mandate to provide appropriate education); Streett,
supra note 1, at 46-47 (stating that IDEA realizes that some children need to be in
special classes, separate schools, residential facilities, hospitals or homes in order
to receive free appropriate public education).
55. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (5) ("[S]pecial classes, separate schooling, or other
removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment
occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot
be achieved satisfactorily."); see also Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1214 (suggesting that use of
"supplementary aids and services" is key to providing children with disabilities with
appropriate education in regular classroom).
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2) (B) (iii) (2000).
2001]
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courts have granted tuition reimbursement, compensatory education and
monetary damages.5 7
a. Tuition Reimbursement
The Supreme Court in School Committee of Town of Burlington v. Depart-
ment of Education58 decided that the IDEA gives federal courts the power to
compel school districts to reimburse parents for tuition paid to a private
school when the school district was not providing an appropriate educa-
tion.5 9 In Burlington, the state agency determined that the learning dis-
abled child at issue, needed to be placed in a private school, such as the
one his father had placed him in, to receive an appropriate education. 60
Based on practical considerations, as well as statutory interpretation and
congressional intent, the Court held that the district court was justified in
enforcing the state's order that the school district reimburse the child's
father for the tuition payments that he had already made.6 1
The Court began its analysis with an examination of the statutory de-
mands on federal district courts hearing appeals of IDEA cases.62 Courts
"(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall
hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its deci-
sion on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the
court determines is appropriate."63 Noting that Congress does not define
what relief it considers "appropriate," the Court construed the word in
accordance with the purpose of the IDEA.6 4 It took the purpose of the
Act from the opening paragraphs of the IDEA: "to assure that all handi-
capped children have available to them ... a free appropriate public edu-
cation which emphasizes special education and related services designed
to meet their unique needs [and] to assure that the rights of handicapped
children and their parents or guardians are protected." 65
57. SeeALLAN G. OSBORNE,JR., LEGAL ISSUES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 176 (1996)
(discussing available forms of remedies).
58. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
59. See id. at 369 (examining statutory grant of authority to federal courts and
framing issue in case as whether scope of authority extends to forced tuition
reimbursement).
60. See id. at 363 (citing decision by Massachusetts Department of Education's
Bureau of Special Education Appeals finding that: (1) school district's proposed
IEP was inappropriate and (2) father's choice of private placement was least re-
strictive appropriate program).
61. See id. at 369 ("We conclude that the Act authorizes such
reimbursement.").
62. See id.
63. See id. (citing statutory language in prior version of IDEA at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(e)(2) (2000)).
64. See id. at 369 (noting that interpretation of word in statute in light of stat-
ute's purpose is only possible interpretation where no other definition is found).
65. Id. at 367 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1997)). The 1997 amendments
to the IDEA replaced the quoted statement with the following: "Improving educa-
tional results for children with disabilities is an essential element of our national
786 [Vol. 46: p. 777
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In keeping with the spirit of the IDEA, the Court considered the ef-
fect that denying parents tuition reimbursements would have on the ac-
complishment of the Act's goals. 66 The Court posited that for a court to
confirm that a parent's child needed to be moved to a private school to
get an appropriate education, without providing reimbursement, would be
an "empty victory."6 7 In addition, granting reimbursement would not hin-
der school districts in helping other children, but would merely make the
district fulfill its original duty. 68 Therefore, Burlington held that tuition
reimbursement is a proper remedy for an IDEA violation.
69
Once explicitly authorized by the Supreme Court, tuition reimburse-
ment became routinely used by courts in all circuits. 70 The Third Circuit
recently approved an award of tuition reimbursement in Ridgewood Board of
Education v. M.E.7 1 The school district in Ridgewood implemented an IEP
policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living,
and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(c)(1) (1997).
66. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 367-69 (applying congressional purpose in en-
acting IDEA to situation faced by child's father).
67. Id. at 370.
68. See id. at 370-71 ("Reimbursement merely requires the Town to belatedly
pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first
instance had it developed a proper IEP.").
69. See id. at 374 (holding that "such relief as the court determines is appro-
priate" includes tuition reimbursement).
In Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), the United
States Supreme Court held that failure of a private placement to meet section 1401
requirements does not bar reimbursement. See id. at 13-15. The parents in Florence
placed their child with a disability in a private school that provided her an appro-
priate education, but did not meet the requirements of section 1401 (a) (18). See
id. at 12-13 (naming as issues settled, "(1) the school district's proposed IEP was
inappropriate under IDEA, and (2) although [the private school] did not meet the
section 1401 (a) (18) requirements, it provided an education otherwise proper
under IDEA"). The Court pointed out that anytime parents move their children
to private schools to ensure an appropriate education, the chosen school will not
meet the requirement that it be "provided at the public expense, tinder public
supervision and direction." See id. at 14. To remain consistent with Burlington's
express authorization for parents to move their children to private schools if neces-
sary, the Court held that the private placements need not meet section 1401 re-
quirements. See id.
The Court also held that unilateral private placements are not invalid simply
because the private school does not meet all of the state's education standards or
appear on the state's list of approved private schools. See id. at 14-15. The private
school at issue in Florence failed to meet South Carolina's requirements that it em-
ploy only state certified teachers and develop IEPs. See id. at 13 (finding that
school's employment of at least two teachers who were not state certified and lack
of procedure for IEPs did not bar parents' reimbursement).
70. See OSBORNE, supra note 57, at 176 (noting that availability of reimburse-
ment is "well settled").
71. 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit has approved awards of
tuition reimbursements in other cases as well. See, e.g., Warren G. ex rel. Tom G. v.
Cumberland County School Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 86 (3d Cir. 1999) (reversing trial
court's denial of tuition reimbursement).
2001]
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that was so ineffective for the child that the school changed his grades to
pass/fail to protect his self-esteem.7 2 When the school district proposed a
new IEP, the parents objected and enrolled the child in a private school,
where he made "considerable progress."73 Although the Third Circuit
had to remand the case to ensure the proper assessment of the IEP's ap-
propriateness, it made clear that the parents should have been reimbursed
if the proposed IEP was inappropriate.7 4
b. Compensatory Education
Compensatory education consists of an award of educational services
in addition to those normally due a child under the law. 75 Although the
Supreme Court has never directly addressed the availability of compensa-
tory education under the IDEA, circuit courts have granted it as a rem-
edy.7 6 The lower courts find their justification for granting compensatory
education from the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington.
77
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided
the first case in which a student with a disability received compensatory
education as a remedy for his school's violation of the IDEA in Miener v.
Missouri.7 8 Miener concerned a fourteen-year-old girl who, as a result of
several operations to remove tumors from her brain, suffered from educa-
tional, emotional and behavioral disorders.79 The school district evalu-
ated the girl as in need of special education, but failed to provide
services.8 0 Meiner's father could not afford to place her in a private
school and had to opt for a state-run residential health facility.8 j The
court reasoned that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court could in-
tend that children whose parents can afford private school should get
72. See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 172 F.3d at 244 (reporting child's failure to
progress despite provision of individual reading tutoring, resource center instruc-
tion in English, and supplementary instruction in science and social studies).
73. See id. at 245 (noting that parents thought school district could not prop-
erly educate their son and placed him at private school that specialized in educat-
ing children with learning disabilities).
74. See id. at 248 (stating that student may be entitled to reimbursement if he
meets his burden under Florence).
75. See YELL, supra note 26, at 300 (defining compensatory education). The
additional services are generally provided after the child has reached the age of
twenty-one, but may be provided during the summer or after school while the
child is still covered by the IDEA. See id.
76. See, e.g., M.C. v. Cent. Reg'l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. 1996)
(holding plaintiff was entitled to compensatory education); Miener v. Missouri,
800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986) (same).
77. See Miener, 673 F.2d at 982 ("We view the request for compensatory ser-
vices as practically indistinguishable from a request for ... reimbursement [under
Burlington].").
78. 800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986).
79. See id. at 751 (recounting child's medical history).
80. See id.
81. See id.
[Vol. 46: p. 777
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their full entitlement to a free appropriate public education, with reim-
bursement under Burlington, while those who cannot afford private school
must lose some amount of education. 82 As a result, the court granted
compensatory education. 8 3
Most circuits have followed Miener and recognize the availability of
compensatory education, albeit under different standards of school dis-
trict liability.8 4 The Third Circuit solidified its standard for the award of
compensatory education in M.C. v. Central Regional School District.85 At is-
sue was a boy suffering from severe mental retardation whose obvious
need for residential care was ignored by the school district.86 The court
summarized its holding as follows:
[A] school district that knows or should know that a child has an
inappropriate IEP or is not receiving more than a de minimis
educational benefit must correct the situation. If it fails to do so,
a disabled child is entitled to compensatory education for a pe-
riod equal to the period of deprivation, but excluding the time
reasonably required for the school district to rectify the
problem. 87
As a result, the Third Circuit will award compensatory education if
the student proves that the school district knew or should have known it
was providing an inappropriate education. 88
82. See id. at 753 ("We are confident that Congress did not intend the child's
entitlement to a free education to turn upon her parent's ability to 'front' its
costs.").
83. See id. at 754 (directing district court to award compensatory education if
it found school district failed to provide appropriate education).
84. See Erickson v. Albuquerque, 199 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 1999) (ac-
knowledging student's right to compensatory education if he proved denial of free
appropriate public education); Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 79 F.3d 654,
656 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing award of compensatory education as appropriate
in light of Burlington); Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31 F.3d 1489,
1496 (9th Cir. 1994) ("There is no question that the district court had the power
to order compensatory education"); Pihl v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 188
(1st Cir. 1993) (" [W]e have no difficulty in joining those circuits that have decided
that compensatory education is available to remedy past deprivations."). But see
Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 979 F. Supp. 147, 150-51 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)
(denying availability of compensatory education past age of twenty-one where stu-
dent did not prove gross violation of IDEA), aff'd, 208 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2000).
85. 81 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 1996).
86. See id. at 392-94 (describing child's regression in ability to perform essen-
tial self-care functions, such as dressing himself, and noting that experts recognize
that it is easier for individuals with severe retardation to learn self-care skills in
residential setting).
87. Id. at 397.
88. See id. (establishing student's burden); see also Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v.
M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 250 (3d Cir. 1999) (reiterating "knew or should have known"
standard).
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c. Monetary Damages
Courts have struggled with the question of whether monetary dam-
ages for failure to provide an appropriate education are available under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for an IDEA violation.89 Section 1983 provides a mecha-
nism for citizens to secure remedies for violations of federal statutes by
state actors.9 Although both Congress and the Supreme Court have
weighed in on the issue, the circuits remain split on the availability of
monetary damages under § 1983.91
In Smith v. Robinson,9 2 the Supreme Court expressed its opinion that
monetary damages are not available under § 1983 for IDEA violations.93
Congress reacted to the Smith decision by enacting the Handicapped Chil-
dren's Protection Act of 1986, which stated that "[nlothing in this title
shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies
available under the Constitution, Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
89. See Osborne, supra note 27, at 14-20 (examining use of damages in various
courts). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). The term "damages," as used in the field of special edu-
cation law, refers to punitive awards and does not include tuition reimbursement,
compensatory education or attorney fees. See Osborne, supra note 27, at 14 (speci-
fying meaning of damages).
Damages may also be available under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
See Osborne, supra note 27, at 18 (citing Whitehead v. Sch. Dist. for Hillsborough
County, 918 F. Supp. 1515 (M.D. Fla. 1996), which awarded monetary damages
under Section 504 for intentional discrimination and retaliatory action by school
district). This Casebrief does not explore rights and remedies under the Rehabili-
tation Act.
90. See Gail Paulus Sorenson, School District Liability for Federal Civil Rights Viola-
tions Under Section 1983, 76 EDuc. L. REP. 313, 314-16 (1993) (describing history
and workings of § 1983).
91. See Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1272 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000)
(examining case law in several circuits); Osborne, supra note 27, at 16 (discussing
damages for failure to provide appropriate education).
92. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
93. See id. at 1012 ("We ...conclude that Congress intended to preclude
reliance on § 1983 as a remedy .... ). The Court found that "Congress intended
the [IDEA] to be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert an
equal protection claim to a publicly financed special education." Id. at 1009. This
decision was based on: (1) the comprehensiveness of procedures and guarantees
under IDEA and (2) Congress' design placing primary responsibility on state and
local agencies and parents. See id. at 1009-11 (expressing opinion that statute must
be construed to not render any language superfluous and that federal district
courts are not as good as state and local actors at dealing with issues of education).
Justice Brennan's dissent argued that the Court must let § 1983 operate to the
extent that it is not repugnant to the IDEA so plaintiffs can make § 1983 claims
after exhausting IDEA procedures. See id. at 1023-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 46: p. 777
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or other Federal statutes protecting the rights of handicapped children
and youth .... -"4 The circuits are split on whether this provision reversed
Smith to-the extent that it denied the possibility of recovery under § 1983
for IDEA violations.
95
The Supreme Court, in a 1992 Title IX case, Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools,9 6 supported the courts and scholars arguing for the
availability of compensatory damages.9 7 The Court expressed the theory
that a determination of what rights are guaranteed by federal statutes and
what remedies are available to compensate the injured party are analyti-
cally different. 98 Therefore, even if a court finds that a child has a right to
pursue a claim for an IDEA violation under § 1983, it still has to decide
whether the remedy of monetary damages is available. 99 In Franklin, the
Court first acknowledged a plaintiffs implied right under Title IX, then
turned to the question of the availability of monetary damages. 10° The
Franklin Court held that courts should "presume the availability of all ap-
propriate remedies unless Congress had expressly indicated otherwise." 1° 1
The Third Circuit is among those that have interpreted section
1415(1) and Franklin to mean that parties injured by violations of the IDEA
may seek damages under § 1983.102 In W.B. v. Matula,'0 3 a case discussed
more fully below, the Third Circuit reviewed a case in which the school
district refused to provide the plaintiff child with IDEA services until com-
94. Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 3(f), 100 Stat. 1145 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1415(1) (2000)). The current provision reads: "Nothing in this title shall
be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available
under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities of 1990, Title V of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children
with disabilities .....
20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) (2000).
95. See STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 251-58 (Oakstone
Legal & Bus. Publ'g ed., 17th ed. 2000) (collecting cases in which courts have gone
both ways on question of effect of section 1415(1) on Smith holding).
96. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
97. See generally.
98. See id. at 65-66 (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979)).
99. See, e.g., W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493-95 (3d Cir. 1995) (analyzing first
existence of § 1983 right of action, then addressing question of availability of
damages).
100. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677
(1979)).
101. Id. at 66.
102. See Matula, 67 F.3d at 494 ("In enacting § 1415(f), Congress specifically
intended that ERA violations could be redressed by . . . § 1983 actions .... ").
Indeed, courts in the Third Circuit had granted compensatory damages even
before Franklin. See Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873 (3d Cir. 1990) ("We
conclude that Congress empowered the courts to grant a compensatory remedy.");
Bd. of Educ. v. Diamond ex rel. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 995 (3d Cir. 1986) (argu-
ing that HCPA adopted Justice Brennan's dissenting view in Smith, which would
allow monetary damages).
103. 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995).
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pelled do so to by an administrative ruling. 10 4 The child, who suffered
from Tourette's Syndrome, a severe obsessive-compulsive disorder, and At-
tention Deficit Disorder/Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
("ADHD"), struggled through first and second grade with no support ser-
vices. 10 5 The Third Circuit, following the reasoning of Franklin, held that
damages under § 1983 are available because the IDEA does not exclude
them and the legislative history of the Act and its amendments indicate
that monetary damages should be available.1
0 6
At least one circuit, however, continues to deny children compensa-
tory damages for violations of the IDEA.10 7 In ex rel. Sellers v. School Board
of the City of Manassas, 10 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reviewed a case in which the plaintiff, who was eighteen-years-old,
had just recently been diagnosed as learning disabled and emotionally dis-
turbed. 109 He and his parents unsuccessfully sought compensatory dam-
ages under the IDEA, arguing that the school district should have known
the plaintiff required special education services as early as fourth grade. 10
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, citing the fact that, although section 1415(1)
expressly preserves children's rights under the Rehabilitation Act and the
Constitution, it does not mention § 1983.111 In addition, the court found
that monetary damages are "simply inconsistent with IDEA's statutory
scheme."1 12 It reasoned, therefore, that Congress' enactment of section
1415(1) did not overrule Smith's ruling that remedies under other statutes
are not available for violations of the IDEA.I 13
104. See id. at 489-90 (reporting administrative order requiring the school dis-
trict to pay for child's education at private school and therapy).
105. See id. (describing extent of child's disabilities and noting that school
district fought mother's requests for evaluations and services at every step of
process).
106. See id. at 493-95 (examining text of IDEA and discussing Senate Report,
House Report and House Conference Report). The court could not grant any
damages to the plaintiff, however, because a prior legal settlement between the
parties prohibited the new action. See id. at 502 (affirming grant of summary judg-
ment for defendants on IDEA claim).
107. SeePadilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,233 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir.
2000) (adopting Fourth Circuit's rationale); Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of
Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e hold that parties may not sue
under section 1983 for an IDEA violation."); see also Wenger v. Canastota Cent.
Sch. Dist., 979 F. Supp. 147, 152 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding monetary damages un-
available under IDEA), affd, 208 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2000) (same).
108. 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998).
109. See id. at 525-26.
110. See id. (describing elements of complaint and denial of compensatory
damages by administrative law judge and trial court).
111. See id. at 530 (arguing that section 1415(l)'s reference to preservation of
rights under "other Federal statutes" cannot refer to § 1983, which does not refer to
education or disabilities).
112. Id. at 527.
113. See id. at 530 (stating that if Congress meant to overrule Robinson on the
point of remedies it would have explicitly done so).
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III. REMEDIES FOR IDEA VIOLATIONS IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
A. Tuition Reimbursement
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit interpreted the right to
reimbursement in Ridgewood Board of Education v. M.E. 1 4 The Ridgewood
court summarized the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the IDEA as
requiring that a student prove that: (1) the public school IEP is inappro-
priate; and (2) the private school placement is proper under the IDEA. 1 1 5
In Ridgewood and several other cases, the Third Circuit construed these
requirements so as to place a minimal burden on the student." 6
As interpreted by the Third Circuit, the child's first burden is to prove
that the IEP designed and sought to be implemented was inappropri-
ate. ' 17 The district court in Ridgewood required the child to go further and
show that any type education in the public setting could not provide an
appropriate education. 118 The circuit court rejected this interpretation
and held that a child need not prove that he or she could theoretically get
an appropriate education in the public setting, but need only prove that
he or she would not get an appropriate education under the IEP that the
school district insisted on using.' 19
As to the second burden for the child-to prove that the private
placement is proper-the Third Circuit does not require that the private
education be perfect. 2 °1 A private placement is proper if it is "appropri-
ate" and constitutes the least restrictive environment. 12 1 A private school
is not improper simply because it provides a more restrictive environment
114. See generally Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. M.E., 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999).
For a discussion of the Ridgewood case, see supra notes 71-74 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's holding on tuition reimbursement,
see supra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
115. See Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 248 (adopting interpretation of United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Walczak v. Florida Union Free School Dis-
trict, 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 1998)).
116. See T.R. v. Kingwood Township Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 581-82 (3d
Cir. 2000) (minimizing student burden by not requiring showing that private
school placement is "least restrictive environment"); Warren G. ex rel. Tom G. v.
Cumberland County Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 83-84 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Ridge-
wood, 172 F.3d at 248-49 (same).
117. For a discussion of private placement issues, see supra note 82 and accom-
panying text.
118. See Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 248 (noting that although district court found
public IEP was appropriate, district court indicated that there was "no evidence in
the record suggesting that [the IEP was] not appropriate to provide educational
services for [the plaintiff] in a public setting").
119. See id. at 248-49 ("Under IDEA, the relevant question is not whether a
student could in theory receive an appropriate education in a public setting but
whether he will receive such an education.").
120. See id. at 248 (listing requirements imposed by Florence).
121. See id. at 248-49 & n.8 (explaining child's burdens (citing Oberti v. Bd. of
Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993)). For a discussion of the definitions of free
appropriate education and least restrictive environment, see supra notes 39-55 and
accompanying text.
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than the school district would provide. 122 The Third Circuit indicated in
1999 that "the test for the parents' private placement is that it is appropri-
ate, and not that it is perfect." 123 As a result, a court should only consider
whether the chosen school provided an appropriate education, rather
than look at all available private schools to locate the least restrictive ap-
propriate one.
124
B. Compensatory Education
The Third Circuit allows the award of compensatory education under
a negligence-like standard, rather than upon proof of bad faith or gross
violation.' 2 5 Its decision in M.C. v. Central Regional School District estab-
lished both the child's burden to qualify for compensatory education and
the proper manner to measure the size of the award.' 26 The Third Cir-
cuit's position, that compensatory education is available to any student
who can show the school district knew or should have known that his or
her IEP was inappropriate, is based on prior case law and the language of
the IDEA itself.
12 7
In adopting the negligence-like standard, the Third Circuit rejected
standards proposed by other circuits and by the district court in the
case. 128 The court rejected the Second Circuit's requirement that the stu-
122. See Warren G. ex rel. Tom G. v. Cumberland County Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d
80, 84 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing placement in school that only educated children
with disabilities).
123. Id.
124. See id. (citing Ridgewood and agreeing with United States Court of Ap-
peals for Seventh Circuit in Board of Education v. Illinois State Board of Education, 41
F.3d 1162 (7th Cir. 1994)).
The court had to apply these standards to a unique situation in TR v. King-
wood Township Board of Education, 205 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2000). The child at issue in
T1R. was a preschooler whose parents wanted to keep him at his private preschool
at the state's expense. See id. at 575-76. The school district offered the child half-
days of school in its resource room and half-days in its preschool class, which con-
sisted of half children with disabilities and half children without disabilities. See id.
at 576. Thus, both the public IEP and the private school placement provided an
appropriate education, but the private school provided a less restrictive environ-
ment. See id. at 580-81. The court held that if a private school is among the accred-
ited schools in the state, the school district must consider it when developing an
IEP. See id. at 582. Therefore, a parent may be entitled to reimbursement if he or
she proves that the public school placement was inappropriate because a private
school provided the least restrictive appropriate placement. See id. at 580 (present-
ing possibility that less restrictive private placement may be proper education).
125. See M.C. v. Cent. Reg'l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 391-92 (3d Cir. 1996)
(stating that award of compensatory education is proper when "school district...
knows or should know that a child has an inappropriate [IEP]").
126. See id. at 397 (summarizing holding).
127. See id. at 395-96 (basing decision on lester H. v. Gihool, 916 F.2d 865 (3d
Cir. 1990); Carlisle Area School District v. Scott P. ex rel. Bess P., 62 F.3d 520 (3d Cir.
1995); and 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (2000)).
128. See id. at 395-96 (discussing district court's holding that defendant school
district's proof of good faith precluded award of compensatory education and Sec-
794
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dent show a "gross violation" of the IDEA by the school district to qualify
for compensatory education. 129 The Third Circuit also refused to require
that a student prove bad faith on the part of the school district, although it
has noted that most cases awarding compensatory education involve "quite
culpable conduct."' 30 Nor would the Third Circuit allow the school dis-
trict to escape liability simply by showing it acted in good faith, as the
district court had in M.C.
13
The M.C. court rejected these standards because it insisted that the
standard be grounded within the IDEA itself.132 To this end, the court
began its analysis with the IEP, "the road map for a disabled child's educa-
tion," as guaranteed by the IDEA. 133 The court held that a child is enti-
tled to compensatory education whenever his or her IEP fails to meet the
Third Circuit's standard for appropriate education. 134 Therefore, the
child's burden to get an award of compensatory education is to prove the
school district knew or should have known that his or her IEP was failing
to confer more than a de minimus educational benefit. 1
35
ond Circuit's requirement of gross violation of IDEA for award of compensatory
education).
129. See id. at 396 (rejecting standard used in Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69,
75 (2d Cir. 1990), which required showing of "gross violation," defined as coercion
of child with disability into terminating his or her education).
130. See id. at 396 (citing Carlisle). The first case in which the Third Circuit
awarded compensatory education involved egregious circumstances. See generally
Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 536 (citing Lester H. as support for the statement that "[w] e have
held that compensatory education is available to respond to situations where a
school district flagrantly fails to comply with the requirements of IDEA"); Lester H.
v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, (3d Cir. 1990) (finding school district unreasonably
delayed student-plaintiffs placement in appropriate educational program for no
reason). Lester H. was profoundly retarded and suffered from behavioral
problems so severe that it became necessary to place him in residential care. See
Lester H., 916 F.2d at 867 (noting that in 1984, Lester's private day school and
school district agreed that he required residential placement to make any educa-
tional progress). While Lester waited at home for a placement, the school district
conducted a limited search, which took thirty months, to find an institution to
accept Lester. See id. During this time, the school district implemented an at-
home IEP that provided Lester with only five hours of instruction per week. See id.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Lester's right to compensatory education created
by the school district's negligent failure to ensure his appropriate education. See
id. at 873 (affirming award because school district "had no reason to delay a
proper placement for Lester").
131. See M.C., 81 F.3d at 395-96 (rejecting district court's reliance on fact that
school district believed in good faith that IEP was appropriate).
132. See id. at 396 (stating that neither lower court's nor Second Circuit's stan-
dards were appropriate because they were both imprecise and not anchored in
IDEA).
133. See id. ("If the compensatory education standard is to spring from the
Act, it must focus from the outset upon the IEP .... ).
134. See id. (focusing on statute's guarantee of appropriate education).
135. See id. at 396 n.6 (noting that standard is consistent with decision in
which Third Circuit held that it is necessary, but not sufficient, for a child to show
that some IEP was inappropriate before compensatory education is an appropriate
remedy).
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The court's holding in M.C. is not so narrow that it is inapplicable
where a student had no IEP, as in Ridgewood.136 The school district in
Ridgewood did not classify the student at issue as a child with a disability or
develop an IEP for him until he had finished seventh grade. 137 The Third
Circuit held that the IDEA guarantees every child with a disability "an ap-
propriate education, not merely an appropriate IEP.' 38 Therefore, the
child need only show that the school district provided an inappropriate
education, regardless of whether that education was in the form of an
IEP.139
Once a student has proved his or her right to compensatory educa-
tion, the Third Circuit awards the education based on the length of time
that the student proved the school district failed to provide an appropriate
education. 140 The M.C. court established the rule that a child deserves
compensatory education for a time equal to the period after the school
district knew or should have known the child was not receiving an appro-
priate education, minus a reasonable period for the school district to have
corrected the situation if it acted promptly. 41 The court expressed its
opinion that the preceding standard protects the child's rights to the max-
imum extent possible, while not being overly burdensome on school
districts. 14
2
136. 172 F.3d 238, 249-50 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting narrow interpretation of
M.C.'s requirement of proof of "inappropriate IEP" for award of compensatory
education).
137. See id. at 244-45.
138. Id. at 250.
139. See id. (noting that M.C. decision itself "held the denial of an appropriate
education-and not merely the denial of an appropriate IEP-creates the right to
compensatory education"). Ridgewood also rejected the school district's argument
that education is presumptively appropriate if parents do not object. See id. (argu-
ing that child's right to education does not depend on parent's vigilance).
140. See M.C., 81 F.3d at 397.
141. See id.
142. See id. ("We believe that this formula harmonizes the interests of the
child, who is entitled to a free appropriate education under IDEA, with those of
the school district, to whom special education and compensatory education is
quite costly."). But see John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, No. 98-5781, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6169, at *24 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2000) (noting limits on extent reme-
dies can make child whole by stating that, while child did not qualify for compensa-
tory education, even if he did, "compensatory education after age 21 would not
satisfactorily remedy denial of special services to [child] during his crucial early
educational years").
The court had previously dealt with the argument that grants of compensatory
education are invalid assessments of future educational needs. In Lester H. v.
Gilhool, the Third Circuit agreed with the defendant school district that no court
could speculate at trial what services a child with a disability will need in the future
to make educational progress. See Lester H., 916 F.2d 865, 868-69 (3d Cir. 1990)
(striking down arguments that issue was not ripe and that remedy was too specula-
tive). The court held that grants of compensatory education based on the period
of education denied are not speculative. See id. (noting that compensatory educa-
tion orders should ensure opportunity for appropriate authorities to alter the rem-
edy in the future).
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C. Monetary Damages
The Third Circuit stands out among circuits because of its long recog-
nition that children who have been denied appropriate education may de-
serve monetary damages.1 43 In W.B. v. Matula, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals made a detailed analysis of the interplay between § 1983, the
IDEA and the Supreme Court's ruling in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools.1 4 4 The Matula court concluded that "[i]n enacting § 1415(1),
Congress specifically intended that [IDEA] violations could be redressed
by . . . § 1983 actions."'145
The court began its analysis with a general discussion of § 1983, which
provides a mechanism for plaintiffs to secure a remedy for violations of
federal statutes by state actors. 146 Because § 1983 rights are statutory,
however, their availability depends on congressional intent.
147
The court determined congressional intent to make remedies availa-
ble under § 1983 by relying on section 1415 (1) and legislative history.148 It
argued that § 1983 is a federal statute and, as such, is covered by section
1415(l)'s statement that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to
restrict or limit the . . . remedies available under ... other Federal stat-
utes .... ,149 In addition, the court cited to a House of Representatives
report which stated: "[I] t has been Congress' intent to permit parents or
guardians to pursue the rights of handicapped children through .... se c-
tion 1983 . . . . Congressional intent was ignored by the U.S. Supreme
Court when... it handed down its decision in Smith v. Robinson."'15( From
these sources, the court concluded that Congress did intend § 1983 to
provide a right of private action for IDEA violations.' 5 1
143. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 495 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that com-
pensatory damages are available for IDEA violations); Bd. of Educ. v. Diamond,
808 F.2d 987, 995 (3d Cir. 1986) (concluding that Congress' enactment of section
1415(1) reinstated right to monetary damages under § 1983 for IDEA violations).
144. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). For a discussion of Franklin, see supra notes 66, 97-
101. For a discussion of the facts of Matula, see supra notes 103-05 and accompany-
ing text. The Matula court looked to Franklin, a case dealing with Title IX, because
the Supreme Court used that case to establish a general rule for remedies available
under federal statutes. See Matula, 67 F.3d at 494 (analyzing availability of mone-
tary damages under § 1983 and IDEA).
145. Matula, 67 F.3d at 494.
146. See id. at 493 (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1983), which settled
application of § 1983 to statutory, as well as constitutional, claims).
147. See id. (citing Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority,
479 U.S. 418 (1987)).
148. See id. at 493-94.
149. See id. at 493 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2000)). The House of Repre-
sentatives also concluded that section 1415(1) referred to § 1983. SeeH.R. REP. No.
99-296, at 6-7 (1985) (stating that "other federal statutes" as used in section 1415(1)
includes § 1983).
150. See id. at 494 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-296 (1985)).
151. See id.
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Once a right under § 1983 was confirmed, the court looked to Frank-
lin to decide whether a remedy was available. 152 It thus began with a pre-
sumption that all appropriate remedies, including monetary damages, are
available.153 The Matula court then examined the text and history of the
IDEA and found no expression of congressional intent to disallow mone-
tary damages. 15 4 It must be noted, however, that the court did encourage
trial judges to award monetary damages only if tuition reimbursement and
compensatory education could not make the child whole. 155 Although
the Third Circuit has been reluctant to award monetary damages since
W.B., it has recently acknowledged the availability of compensatory dam-
ages under § 1983.156
IV. CONCLUSION: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE
Practitioners need to take advantage of the Third Circuit's willingness
to grant several forms of remedies for IDEA violations. When the child's
parents have paid for the child to be educated by a private school, a re-
quest should be made for tuition reimbursement.' 57 If the child was not
moved to a private school, counsel must argue for compensatory educa-
tion and monetary damages. 15 8 If the child and parents think that the
school district will provide satisfactory compensatory education, there is
no need to pray for monetary damages. 159 If the school district has been
uncooperative and negligent, or if it flagrantly violated the IDEA, counsel
should apply for monetary damages with an alternative plea for compensa-
tory education.1"6
152. See id. (looking to Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public School, 503 U.S. 6
(1992).
153. See id. (citing Franklin, 503 U.S' at 66, and Court's direction that lower
courts look to text and history of statute to determine if Congress intended right of
action, but presume availability of "all appropriate remedies," unless Congress in-
dicated otherwise).
154. See id. at 494-95 (observing that section 1415(0 does not make any re-
striction on remedies and that legislative history indicates Congress intended
courts would consider remedies not specifically mentioned in IDEA).
155. See id. at 496 ("We caution that in fashioning a remedy for an IDEA viola-
tion, a district court may wish to order ... compensatory education .. .or reim-
bursement for providing at private expense what should have been offered by the
school, rather than compensatory damages for generalized pain and suffering.").
156. See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999)
("[W]e must follow our decision in W.B. v. Matula... which held that IDEA claims
may be actionable under § 1983.").
157. See Osborne, supra note 27, at 5 (stating that parents may be entitled to
reimbursement if they prevail in having placement deemed appropriate).
158. See id. at 9-19 (presenting options for child who remained in public
school despite inappropriateness of education).
159. Cf Matula, 67 F.3d at 495 (urging trial courts to award compensatory
education before monetary damages); Osborne, supra note 27, at 18-19 (noting
that award of damages under § 1983 is controversial and difficult to win).
160. See Osborne, supra note 27, at 20 (stating that claims for monetary dam-
ages usually arise from intentional discrimination or bad faith).
[Vol. 46: p. 777
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Although tuition reimbursement is not a controversial remedy, coun-
sel representing a child needs to fulfill two burdens. 161 First, he or she
must prove that the IEP proposed by the school district was inappropriate
because it failed to confer more than a de minimus educational benefit. 1
62
Second, counsel must show that the private placement was appropriate,
that it conferred more than a de minimus educational benefit, and that it
was not excessively restrictive. 163 The Third Circuit's Ridgewood decision
provides the practitioner with a road map for these arguments and should
be cited as authority.
16 4
To win compensatory education, the practitioner must convince the
judge that the school district knew or should have known the child's IEP
was inappropriate and subsequently failed to act promptly to correct the
situation.165 The date that the school district knew or should have known
that the IEP was not appropriate is important because the award will be
measured based on that date.1 66 The child's counsel does not need to
delve into why the IEP was inappropriate or why the district did not take
remedial action right away. 1
6 7
Although monetary damages are available, Third Circuit courts have
expressed a reluctance to award them.1 68 To receive monetary damages,
counsel should make the case that no other remedy would make the child
whole. 169 This is most likely to work if the situation involved flagrant re-
fusal by the school district to follow the IDEA or action that would cause
the child pain and suffering.
1 70
The Third Circuit, through its awarding of various forms of remedies,
protects children to the extent Congress intended. A speech from the
Senate floor just prior to the vote on the 1997 amendments to the IDEA
sums up the importance of the IDEA: "This bill sends a message to the.
161. See Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 248 (explaining plaintiff's burdens).
162. See id. at 248-49.
163. See id. at 248-49 & n.8.
164. For a detailed discussion of Ridgewood, see supra notes 114-24 and accom-
panying text.
165. For a discussion of elements necessary to secure compensatory education
as a remedy, see supra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
166. See M.C. v. Cent. Reg'! Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. 1996) (man-
dating grant of compensatory education for period equal to time from which
school district knew or should have known IEP was inappropriate, minus reasona-
ble time for district to act to correct IEP).
167. See id. at 396 (noting that award of compensatory education does not
depend on school district's motivation).
168. See Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 253 (noting that although court did not want
to award monetary damages, it decided it "must follow [its] decision in WB. v.
Matula... which held that IDEA claims may be actionable under section 1983.").
169. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 495 (3d Cir.. 1995) (noting that district
courts should look to alternative remedies before monetary damages).
170. Cf Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 252 (indicating greater willingness to grant
monetary damages if child proves more than school district's simple failure to pro-
vide appropriate education).
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country that we care about education, that we care about children, and
that we care about families, that we care about the future."' 7' Every court
should use the IDEA to, those ends.
Jean M. Bond
171. 143 CONG. REC. S4,411 (daily ed. May 14, 1997) (quoting statement
made by Senator Lott).
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